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Abstract 
 
Textual passwords have dominated all other entity authentication mechanisms since 
they were introduced in the early 1960’s.  Despite an inherent weakness against social 
engineering, keylogging, shoulder surfing, dictionary, and brute-force attacks, password 
authentication continues to grow as the Internet expands.  Existing research on password 
authentication proves that dictionary attacks are successful because users make poor choices 
when creating passwords.  To make passwords easier to remember, users select character 
strings that are shorter in length and contain memorable content, like personal identity 
information, common words found in a dictionary, backward spellings of common words, 
recognizable sequences, and easily guessed mnemonic phrases.   
A number of these studies identify weaknesses found in passwords on social media 
sites [1] [2] [3] [4] [5].  However, this body of work fails to explore whether users choose 
more secure passwords on accounts that protect their professional online identity than they 
choose on accounts that are used for personal entertainment. In this study, we first cracked 
passwords from the over 6.4 million unsalted, SHA-1 hashed passwords stolen from the 
professional, social media site, LinkedIn.  Next, we analyzed the length, character set 
composition, and entropy score of the passwords recovered.  Then, we compared our results 
to the analysis of passwords performed by Weir, et al. on the RockYou! dataset to determine 
whether professionals protecting their online presence chose wiser passwords than social 
media site users who play online games. 
In our analysis we found that the users of the professional, social media site, 
LinkedIn, chose more secure passwords than the users of the social media gaming site, 
RockYou!.  LinkedIn passwords contained a greater percentage of numbers, special 
characters, and uppercase letters than RockYou!.  We also found that the LinkedIn 
   
 ix 
passwords utilized special characters more frequently, but RockYou! passwords applied 
special character less predictably. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
Overview 
Entity authentication is the process of confirming the identity of an individual and in 
modern computing the most common method of performing authentication is through a 
text-based password.  A three month study involving one half of a million users found that 
the average user owns roughly twenty-five accounts that require typing a password, and the 
user types about eight passwords a day [6].  Given the popularity of text-based 
authentication and the number of recent password attacks aimed at government facilities [7], 
web portals [8], social media networks [3], and gaming sites [5], it is understandable why 
protecting password-based systems is a major concern in the security industry. 
Entity Authentication 
Although password authentication dominates other forms of authentication, it is not 
the only method of authentication available.  Computer applications authenticate a user’s 
identity with three different methods: what the individual knows, what the individual 
physically possesses, and what physical characteristics make up the individual.  Password 
authentication falls into the first category, what the individual knows.  From a security 
perspective what an individual possesses, a token, and the physical characteristics which 
make up the individual, biometrics, store longer keys which contain more randomness than 
human beings can remember.  The recommended RSA key size stored on a token is 256 
characters, or 2048 bits [9], while an average person only remembers approximately seven 
characters of random data or 56 bits [10]. 
However, token-based authentication requires that the user possess the object in 
order to be recognized.  If the token is not in the user’s possession, authentication cannot 
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occur.  A threat of being lost or stolen also exists.  For this reason many token-based 
systems also require a pass code, which might be forgotten.  Biometrics avoid the problems 
of tokens.  Since physical characteristics travel with a person, biometrics cannot be lost, 
stolen or left somewhere.  However biometric readings may differ from the authentication 
database due to injury, clothing, background noise, illness, and age.  Biometrics, which stores 
attributes of a person’s physical being, also raise privacy concerns for individuals who resist 
technology, and biometrics cannot be revoked easily. 
The greatest drawback of using either token-based or biometric authentication is cost 
and ease of configuration.  Both tokens and biometrics require hardware and software to act 
as an intermediary between the token reader / biometric reader and the system to which the 
user is being authenticated.  Tokens and biometrics require an initial setup period and 
troubleshooting is more complex. 
The disadvantages of using token based and biometric authentication do not apply to 
knowledge based authentication.  Text-based passwords require no special hardware and 
travel well.  They provide cost effective authentication, which is not susceptible to bad 
readings or changes in a person’s physical characteristics.  They are not likely to spawn a 
debate on privacy issues and can be easily revoked.  Password based authentication also 
enables the users to manage their own accounts without the intervention of a system 
administrator.  For these reasons, it is the preferred choice for access to email, social media, 
online banking, medical information, student records, credit card data, gaming, and web 
portal accounts. 
Password Authentication 
Password-based authentication relies on a challenge-response system of verification.  
In the most basic form, an authentication server sends the client a request (the challenge) to 
  3 
  
provide a password, and the client replies (responds) with the password.  The server checks 
the password against a database of passwords for different users and authenticates the user if 
the account and passwords match.  The inherent problem with storing plaintext passwords 
in the database file is that  anyone with access to the file can read the contents, regardless of 
whether they have legitimate rights to read the file or not.  To correct this flaw, secure 
authentication servers store passwords in an “encrypted” format. 
Most modern implementations of password encryption involve cryptographic 
hashing algorithms.  A cryptographic hashing algorithm transforms plain text of variable 
length to a fixed length hash using a one way function.  The computation to create the hash 
from the plaintext is easy, but retrieving the password from the hash value should be 
extremely difficult.  Effective cryptographic hashing algorithms should also resist collisions 
which occur when two known plaintext values are hashed to the same hash value.  It is 
important to note that authentication servers never decrypt hashes.  The servers simply 
compare the hashed password sent from the client to the hashed value in the password 
database.  
With the appropriate systematic methods in place the security of password 
authentication relies on the user’s choices when selecting a password.  Stated another way, in 
secure systems, the length and predictability of the password that a user chooses determines 
the success or failure of an attack.  Many factors determine the choices users make when 
selecting a password: The ease of typing, value of the asset being protected, memorability, 
and knowledge of creating secure passwords all determine how the user chooses a password. 
Despite the amount of research performed in understanding password choices, there 
is no definitive answer to the question “Do users select stronger passwords to protect 
accounts that store valuable information than they select for accounts that provide 
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entertainment?”  In this paper we will focus on the value of the asset being protected by a 
password.  We will attempt to reveal and analyze passwords from the approximately 6.5 
million hashes stolen from the professional social media site, LinkedIn.  According to 
reports from Sophos Security, the SHA1 hashed password appeared on a Russian hacking 
web in June 2012 following the breach [11].  In this analysis we will compare our findings to 
passwords from the online social gaming site, RockYou! to determine whether the value of 
the information being protected plays a role in the level of password security. 
Problem Statement 
This research attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of passwords which protect 
professional social media accounts, like LinkedIn, with respect to their length 
and character composition? 
2. Do the accounts of professional social media sites, like LinkedIn, possess 
more complex passwords than accounts used for personal entertainment, like 
RockYou!? 
Contributions 
The results of this thesis research are two folded 
1. We recovered 2,732,643 plaintext passwords from the SHA1 hashed 
LinkedIn dataset.   Our research produced the largest number of passwords 
studied from a cracked dataset. 
2. We analyzed the passwords and found that the passwords used on the 
professional, social media site LinkedIn possess greater complexity than the 
RockYou! passwords used to access games on social media sites. 
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Organization 
The remainder of this thesis shall be organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives some 
background information and related work. Chapter 3 describes how we obtained plaintext 
passwords from the LinkedIn dataset. Chapter 4 provides the details of our analysis. 
Concluding remarks appear in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Background Information and Related Work 
 
History of text based authentication 
Password authentication emerged in modern computing in 1961 on the MIT 
campus.  System administrators needed a method for limiting the computing time granted to 
each student accessing the Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS), and they created the 
first user accounts protected by text-based passwords [12].  One year later, Allan Scherr, a 
PhD candidate needing more computing time than the four hours per semester allotted to 
each student, submitted a print request for a file named “UACCNT.SECRET”.  The 
printout which appeared in Scherr’s mailbox the following day contained a list of usernames 
and passwords which he exploited to gain more access time and complete his thesis work. 
Scherr’s activities demonstrate that attempts to undermine password security have existed 
since the earliest attempt to protect a computer’s assets with passwords.  Scherr’s password 
authentication malfeasance also begins a history of attempts to subvert text based password 
protection, including not only the unauthorized access of password databases, but also 
phishing, SQL injection, and dictionary, rainbow table, and brute force attacks.  As attacking 
methods improve, so must the understanding of the forces which drive password choices 
and the policies which contribute to more secure authentication. 
Research on password evaluation falls into two categories: studies of length and 
composition and studies of guessing.  Studies which utilize length and composition metrics 
analyze a password’s strength by identifying the number of characters and the type of 
characters chosen.  The type of characters may be numeric, alphabetic upper case, alphabetic 
lower case, special characters, and foreign/other characters.  In contrast, studies which 
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incorporate guessing metrics aim to determine the likelihood of an attacker successfully 
recovering a password. 
Historical evaluation of length and composition research 
In an attempt to plug the largest security hole opened by text based authentication, 
numerous researchers have analyzed password length and composition characteristics 
attempting to determine their level of security and to improve their effectiveness. Morris and 
Thompson’s [13] seminal study in 1979 discovered that 71% of the passwords cracked 
contained either short passwords (less than five characters) or all lowercase or all uppercase 
for longer passwords (5 or 6 letters).  They concluded  
“Given free choice, most people will choose their passwords from a 
restricted character set (e.g. all lower case letters) and will often choose words 
or names.” [13] 
 
Their findings reveal a fundamental component of human nature; people want easy.  By 
choosing passwords containing easy to type and easy to remember character strings, people 
gain access quickly and remember their credentials each time they login.   
Every study which followed Morris and Thompson’s paper echoes their findings 
regarding easily typed passwords.  Spafford’s 1991 study which collected passwords on 54 
machines at the Department of Computer Sciences and the Computing Center found that 
the average length of unique passwords was 6.8 characters with 60.6% of the passwords 
containing all lowercase letters or all numeric characters.  Wu, using a dictionary attack of 
passwords on a Kerberos realm in 1999, found 84.5 % of the passwords contained eight 
characters or less and 86% of the passwords could be typed without the Shift key [14].  In a 
more recent study from 2010, Devillers found that, in the RockYou! dataset, most of the 
passwords fell between six and eight characters.  Lowercase only, digit only, and lowercase 
and digit passwords accounted for 91% of the passwords analyzed [2]. 
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With respect to the factors of memorability, research also matches Morris and 
Thompson’s findings that users will chose words and names rather than random character 
strings.  A study by Riddle et al in 1989 categorized 6226 passwords based on their content, 
such as names, words, and random strings [15].  Like Riddle, Cazier and Medlin classified 
passwords based on content in their study of an e-business site with no password policy.  
Using a five grade scale with obvious names and numbers at the bottom of the scale and 
unrecognizable strings alphabetic, numeric, and special characters at the top, their research 
found that the mean of passwords fell below the midpoint of the scale [16].  Words and 
names are used so frequently in password selection that one psychologist called passwords 
“a 21st century Rorschach inkblot test” [17], because people choose password based on 
thoughts just below the subconscious, and these thoughts may possess an emotional 
component which make them easier to remember. 
Other research proves that even when words are not used, memorability drives 
password choice.  Kuo, et al., studied the mnemonic devices used to create passwords from 
memorable phrases.  The team collected phrases based on Google searches of nursery 
rhymes, advertising slogans, television theme songs, and other memorable quotes.  The 
400,000 entry word list which they generated, based on a letter, number, or special character 
representing each word in the phrase, cracked 4% of the phrase based passwords collected 
[18]. In 2005, Narayanan and Shmatikov proved that the distribution of common passwords 
is consistent with the distribution of letters in the users’ native language and launched a 
dictionary attack based on this model which recovered 67.6% of the passwords attempted 
[19]. 
Although research confirms that users select convenient and memorable passwords, 
only a few conflicting studies exist that compare password choices and demographics.  Most 
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notably, Medlin and Cazier found that males logging onto an e-commerce site chose more 
complex passwords than their female counterparts [20].  They suggest that this difference 
may have resulted from the larger number of males in the workforce, where employers 
provide secure password training and enforcement.  Bonneau’s analysis of data on nearly 70 
million Yahoo! passwords found the opposite to be true.  With regard to demographic 
factors, like culture, gender, and race, password distributions remained consistent with 
respect to all of the various subpopulations. [21]   
Historical evaluation of guessing metrics 
Claude Shannon’s groundbreaking work for Bell Laboratories [22] provides a starting 
point for another method for evaluating passwords, guessing metrics.  Prior to Shannon’s 
work, the definition of information was based largely on the work of Kant who defined 
information as a subjective reality perceived by the senses and assigned meaning by the mind 
[23].  Shannon’s work focused not on the meaning or significance of information, but on the 
encoding and transmission of a message through a given channel.  This perspective 
reinterpreted information as objective and quantifiable.  “Entropy”, the term Shannon gave 
to the amount of information gained (or the amount of uncertainty reduced), could be 
measured through a sequence of probabilities involving the symbols (i.e. letters, numbers, 
and punctuation) used to encode a message.  The equation for entropy, H, can be 
determined for a discrete, random variable x using the calculation: 
Equation 1: Shannon entropy 
𝐻(𝑥) =  − ∑ 𝑃(𝑥)𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑔2
𝑛
𝑖
𝑃(𝑥)𝑖  
where each variable (x1, x2, x3,…xn) in the set of X possesses a probable outcome (p1, p2, 
p3,…pn) in the distribution.  As an example, if we wish to determine the information gained 
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by flipping a coin, we can represent 𝑥𝐻 as landing on heads and 𝑥𝑇 as landing on tails and 
the entropy calculation becomes H(x) =  −(𝑃(𝑥)𝐻 log2𝑃(𝑥)𝐻 + 𝑃(𝑥)𝑇 log2𝑃(𝑥)𝑇  ).  If 
the coin has an even chance of landing on head as tails then 𝑃(𝑥)𝐻 equals 50% and 𝑃(𝑥)𝑇, 
equals 50%  By inserting these values into the equation, H(x) =
 −((. 5)log2(.5)+ (. 5)log2(.5)), a single coin flip results in 1 bit of information. 
Although the entropy equation calculates the resources required to store or transmit 
hashed passwords, the calculation fails to provide a metric for determining the vulnerability 
of a system or the ease of guessing a password.  A 2006 NIST publication adds ambiguity to 
the term entropy by redefining the word as a metric for measuring password complexity not 
the amount of information gained or the guessing difficulty.  Rather than incorrectly attempt 
to determine the number of guesses required to by an attacker to uncover a password using 
Shannon’s entropy or the NIST publication’s entropy, the metric guessing entropy was 
introduced [24].  To compute the average number of guesses required to determine the value 
of X employing an optimal guessing strategy, the equation would be: 
Equation 2: Guessing entropy 
𝐸[𝐺(𝑋)] =  ∑ 𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Another useful guessing model presented by Botzaş [25] simulates a real world attacker’s 
strategy by limiting the number of guesses to 𝛽 per appears in the equation: 
Equation 3: Botzaş guessing success rate 
𝜆𝛽(𝑋) =  ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝛽
𝑖=1
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Pliam also simulates a real world attacker’s approach to uncovering passwords by not trying 
to guess every account, but instead to crack a predetermined proportion of the accounts, 𝛼, 
using the equation: 
Equation 4: Pliam guessing proportion 
𝜇𝛼 (𝑋) = min {j| ∑ 𝑝i ≥ α
j
i=1 } 
Bonneau combines Botzaş and Pliam’s work and shows an attacker limiting the number of 
guesses and stopping early if a desired number of accounts have been cracked as shown in 
the calculation: 
Equation 5: Bonneau guessing early termination 
𝐺𝛼(𝑋) = (1 − 𝜆𝜇𝛼) ∙ 𝜇𝛼 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑖
𝜇𝛼
𝑖=1
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Chapter 3 
 
The LinkedIn Dataset and Password Recovery Methods 
 
The LinkedIn dataset will be used in this study, and it contains 6,458,020 SHA1-
hashed passwords stored in a Password Verification Data (PVD) file.  The PVD file includes 
2,936,840 unaltered, SHA1 hashed passwords and 3,521,180 SHA1 hashes in which the 
leading five characters of the hash have been replaced by zeroes.  The SHA1 hashes of many 
common passwords, like “password”, “linkedin”, “123456” match hashes in the leading 
zeroes list when the first five characters are replaced with zeros.  For this reason, it has been 
postulated that the zero-leading hash list contains the passwords which have already been 
cracked by tagging the first five characters with a zero in place of the actual characters. 
We began our analysis by separating the PVD file into two groups: the straight SHA1 
hashes and the zero-leading SHA1 hashes.  We searched each list individually for duplicates 
and found none, so we started the process of cracking passwords.  First we engaged in a 
rainbow table attack using rcracki_mt software [26].   Since the zero-leading SHA1 list 
represents altered hashes, traditional SHA1 cracking tools, like rcraki_mt, would not work 
with this list.  We subjected only the straight SHA1 password list to the rainbow table attack.  
The key space for this attack consisted of one to seven characters with all combinations of 
uppercase letters [A-Z], lowercase letters [a-z], and digits [0-9].  Due to the resource 
intensive nature of rainbow table cracking, we divided the straight SHA1 hashes into smaller 
files containing between one thousand and five thousand hashes.  These files were cracked 
distributively on twenty different machines on campus at James Madison University over the 
course of eight months. 
Computer Science classes on-campus utilize lab workstations during the daytime 
hours, so we conducted our research at night, on weekends, and during breaks, when these 
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machines were available.  Every evening, after classes ended, we ran twenty tasks stored in 
the Windows Task Scheduler which opened various putty sessions.   Each putty session 
logged into a central on-campus server.  The session also ran a remote login command 
which created an SSH session with a lab computer and ran a script which started the 
rcracki_mt software on a unique set of hashes to crack.  Appendix B contains the entire bash 
script which starts new cracking sessions, resumes existing cracking sessions, and ensures 
that the cracking session ends at 7:50am, to prevent from interfering with normal operations 
of the lab. 
After completing the rainbow cracking exploit, we removed the hashes of cracked 
passwords from the straight SHA1 hash list and began cracking passwords using John the 
Ripper (JtR) [27] on a single desktop computer with Backtrack 5.   We installed a patch to 
JtR called “JtR-Jumbo-5-LinkedIn-SHA1.diff”. This patch adds a format which can be 
specified at the command line to crack both traditional SHA1 hashes and the leading zeros 
hashes found in the LinkedIn PVD file.  We performed an initial crack of all passwords 
using the “all.lst” wordlist from openwall.com [27].  A Google search for additional 
dictionaries found the cracked passwords from the RockYou! security breach, foreign word 
dictionaries, and medical term wordlists.  Then we ran dictionary attacks on each of the 
wordlists downloaded from the internet.  In addition to these attacks, we also applied 
various default mangling rules found in the john.config file.  For more mangling options, we 
downloaded and used rules from Kore Logic Security [28]. 
In comparing the cracked password results from the two lists, duplicate values began 
to emerge.  Although we performed a duplicates search on the lists individually, a duplicate 
search between the lists was not performed.  For the benefit of future studies and to 
accurately reflect the percentage of passwords found, we copied the original list of straight 
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SHA1 hashes, replaced the first five digits with zeros, and searched for duplicates.  This 
search produced 670,781 redundant values between the two lists leaving a total of 5,787,239 
hashes between the two lists.  Of the passwords cracked we found 54,916 duplicates existed 
in the two cracked password lists.   We removed these passwords from the leading zero 
passwords cracked list. 
Our work cracking straight SHA1 hashes revealed 78,720 passwords through 
rainbow table cracking and 211,049 passwords through JtR with mangling rules.  We 
uncovered 2,442,874 passwords in the zero leading hash list using JtR with mangling rules.  
These totals produce a combined sum of 2,732,643 cracked passwords or 47.22% of the 
entire PVD file with duplicates removed. 
It is important to note that, of the significant research in the field of password 
analysis which we outlined in Chapter 2 and produced in Table 9: Password cracking history, 
our study provides the largest number of cracked passwords analyzed.  The passwords in the 
RockYou! and the Yahoo! datasets contain more passwords, but neither of these datasets 
require password cracking.  The RockYou! dataset originated from an SQL injection exploit 
which produced the 32 million account names and passwords in clear text.  The Yahoo! 
password dataset of approximately 70 million passwords resulted from a cooperative effort 
between Bonneau, the author of the study, and Yahoo!, the web portal providing the data. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Analysis of LinkedIn Passwords 
 
No single, commonly agreed upon methodology exists for password analysis. 
Although many studies rely on length and composition metrics, the methods in which they 
are applied are as numerous as the studies themselves.  Guessing metrics provide a 
consistent alternative to length and composition analysis, but relatively little password 
research with real data has been done using any single guessing metric.  The NIST metric for 
measuring password complexity has also been used infrequently, because the definition of 
the term entropy is not consistent with the definition known to most researchers in the field. 
To perform analysis on the LinkedIn dataset, we chose to use length and 
composition metrics.  We will also calculate the NIST entropy value of the passwords 
recovered to measure their complexity.  We will proceed with the understanding that these 
metrics measures password complexity, but fail to measure the level of difficulty that an 
attacker would have breaking into the account.  For example a password like Button123! 
would have the complexity to pass most authentication requirements, but a simple mangling 
rule would make this password easy prey for a standard dictionary attack.  We chose not to 
use guessing metrics in our analysis because the LinkedIn dataset contains unique hashes.  In 
order to work with guessing metrics, each hash in the dataset must have a probability 
distribution over the entire set of possibilities.   
In order to gauge the level of complexity of LinkedIn passwords, we will compare 
the passwords revealed through our work with length and patterns in character composition 
found in Weir’s analysis of the RockYou! dataset [5].  Since RockYou! builds social media 
games and advertising products for sites, like Facebook, MySpace, and Friendster, we expect 
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to find less complex and less random authentication strings than the password on LinkedIn 
which presents professionals to a network of other professionals online. 
Password Information 
To begin our analysis, we will identify the length and character type composition of 
passwords from the two datasets.  Weir generated a table which captures passwords greater 
than various lengths beginning with seven characters.  His findings appear in Table 1: 
Password Information with our results added for comparison. 
Table 1: Password Information 
Character 
Set 
Contains 
7+ Chars 8+ Chars 9+ Chars 10+ Chars 
 RY! LI RY! LI RY! LI RY! LI 
Digits 57.5% 74.2% 59.5% 76.1% 60.2% 78.3% 60.0% 79.0% 
Special 
Characters 
4.4% 5.6% 5.1% 6.6% 6.6% 10.3% 8.0% 11.7% 
Uppercase 6.5% 19.1% 6.7% 19.8% 6.9% 25.0% 7.1% 26.5% 
Only 
Lowercase 
Letters, 
Digits 
89.2% 50.9% 88.4% 51.5% 86.7% 49.8% 85.1% 48.3% 
 
Weir found that as passwords grew in length the percentage of digits, special 
characters, and uppercase letters also increased.  The LinkedIn dataset echoes this trend.  
The percentage of digits, special characters and uppercase letters in the LinkedIn passwords 
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not only grew, but also surpassed the RockYou! dataset for each password length as shown 
in Figure 1: Password Information. 
Figure 1: Password Information 
 
The only category where the RockYou! dataset surpasses LinkedIn is the Lowercase 
Letters and Digits.  Studies have shown that the most common passwords are also the 
easiest to type and contain only lowercase letters  [1] [2] [13] .  In some studies, easy to type 
passwords, which include only lowercase letters and numbers, account for over 50% of the 
passwords [1] [29].  Other studies show this number much higher; exceeding 80% [2] [13] 
[14].  The RockYou! dataset not only exceeds the LinkedIn dataset in these easier to type 
passwords at every length, but also exceeds the LinkedIn dataset by a significant amount 
(36.80-38.30%). 
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Digits 
Users frequently add numeric characters to passwords.  This practice increases the 
complexity of the password by expanding the key space and strengthening the security of the 
authentication system.   A password which contains only lowercase characters of the 
alphabet possesses a key space of 26L, where L is the length of the password.  When upper 
case characters are added, the key space increases to 52L.  The key space grows to 62L, if 
digits are introduced to the uppercase and lowercase letters. 
Of the 2,160,956 passwords cracked with seven or more characters, our study 
produced 1,603,813 passwords with digits (74.21%).  This is much higher than the 26% 
found by Wu and 31.7% found by Spafford [29], but not quite as high as the 81% found by 
Schneier [4].  Weir does not provide a percentage of passwords which contain digits.  Instead 
his study approaches the use of digits by analyzing the most frequently used number strings 
and the placement of numbers within a password. 
 Table 2: Top Ten Digits shows the detailed results of Weir’s study of frequently 
used number strings.  We added our findings on a random sample of 100,000 passwords 
with digits.    
 
Table 2: Top Ten Digits 
Rank RY! Digit RY! Percentage LI Digit LI Percentage 
1 1 10.98% 1 10.07% 
2 2 2.79% 2 3.01% 
3 123 2.29% 3 2.60% 
4 4 2.10% 0 2.27% 
5 3 2.02% 4 2.03% 
6 123456 1.74% 123 1.99% 
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Rank RY! Digit RY! Percentage LI Digit LI Percentage 
7 12 1.49% 01 1.54% 
8 7 1.20% 12 1.49% 
9 13 1.07% 7 1.28% 
10 5 1.04% 5 1.26% 
 
The results for this analysis demonstrate that users rarely choose digits randomly.  In 
the two top ten lists, eight of the ten values are shared: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, and 123. Weir 
discovered that 26.72% of the digits used appear in the top ten list.  Our study closely 
mirrors the RockYou! dataset with 27.54% of the total digits used appearing in the top ten 
list.   
Studies by Schneier [4], Devillers [2], and Wu [14] recognize the popularity of the 
number one.  Both our study and Weir’s analysis place the number one in the top position in 
number rankings.  The number one not only holds the top position in the Weir study, but 
five of the items in Weir’s top ten list also contain a one.  Digits containing a one comprise 
20% of the total passwords with digits.  Our top ten list also places one in the top position 
with 10.07% of the total which is slightly lower than Weir found.  The number one appears 
as one of the digits in three other values in our top ten list, 123, 01, and 12.   In total, the 
number one appears in 15.09% of the top ten list for the LinkedIn sample.  With respect to 
the most popular digits found, numbers in the passwords from the LinkedIn dataset are less 
predictable than the numbers found in the RockYou! dataset. 
To fully understand the use of digits in a password, consideration must also be given 
to where the digits in a password appear.  Common patterns in digit placement indicate a 
lower level of security than random placement.  A comparison of passwords in Weir’s 
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RockYou! dataset and the LinkedIn dataset appear in Table 3: How Digits are used in 7+ 
Character Passwords and Figure 2: How Digits are used in 7+ Character Passwords. 
 
Table 3: How Digits are used in 7+ Character Passwords 
Location Example RockYou! LinkedIn 
All Digits 1234567 20.51% 6.08% 
After  password123 64.28% 74.89% 
Before 123password 5.95% 8.62% 
Other passw0rd, pass123word, p1a2ssword, … 9.24% 10.40% 
 
Figure 2: How Digits are used in 7+ Character Passwords 
  
 
As described previously, passwords which contain only digits use a smaller key space 
and provide less security than passwords of the same length with both numbers and letters.  
The RockYou! dataset triples LinkedIn with respect to digit only passwords.  Several studies 
[1], [2], [4], [14] [19] mention another common pattern of simply prepending or appending 
digits to an alphabetic string of characters.  In this regard, the LinkedIn password set has a 
greater percentage than RockYou!.  When LinkedIn users type numeric digits, 83.51% of 
20.51%
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5.95%
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these passwords prepend and append digits to alphabetic characters as opposed to the 
70.23% by RockYou! users.   
The most uncommon location where digits will be found is in the middle of a 
password.  Only a slight 1.16% difference exists between the LinkedIn and RockYou! 
datasets.   For passwords which contain digits, LinkedIn passwords possess numbers in the 
middle of the password 10.40% of the time, while RockYou! passwords contain numbers in 
the middle 9.24% of the time. 
Uppercase Characters 
As with adding digits to a password, the addition of uppercase characters increases 
the size of the key space which, in turn, makes a password more secure.  Like with digits, 
password security depends not only on the existence of uppercase characters to expand the 
key space, but also on placement of these characters in unpredictable locations within 
passwords.  Users frequently incorporate capital letters in passwords by typing all capital 
letters or by typing an initial capital letter followed by all lower case letters [1] [19].  Weir 
noticed that these two capitalization patterns account for almost 90% of all passwords in the 
RockYou! dataset which contain an uppercase character.  The composition of 7 character 
passwords which include at least one uppercase character appear in Table 4: Top Ten Case 
Mangling Rules for 7 characters and Figure 3: Top Ten Case Mangling Rules for 7 
characters.  The LinkedIn dataset appears to the right of the totals from the Weir study for 
comparison. 
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Table 4: Top Ten Case Mangling Rules for 7 characters 
Rank RockYou! String:  RockYou! Probability LinkedIn String LinkedIn Probability 
1 UUUUUUU 53.56% ULLLLNN 12.10% 
2 ULLLLLL 35.69% ULLLLLL 12.00% 
3 ULLLULL 1.05% ULLLLLN 9.94% 
4 LLLLLLL 1.03% UUUUUUU 4.90% 
5 ULLLLLU 0.90% ULLNNNN 3.03% 
6 ULLULLL 0.85% UUUNNNN 2.48% 
7 ULULULU 0.68% ULLLNNN 2.43% 
8 LLLLLLU 0.62% UUUUUNN 1.57% 
9 UULLLLL 0.61% ULLNLLL 1.13% 
10 UUULLLL 0.59% UUUUUUN 1.07% 
 
Figure 3: Top Ten Case Mangling Rules for 7 characters 
  
 
In the RockYou! dataset, all uppercase passwords account for 53.56% of the total 
number of passwords while the single uppercase character followed by all lowercase 
characters comprise another 35.69%.  For an attacker aiming to exploit the easiest targets, 
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applying mangling rules with only these two variations would crack almost nine out of ten 
vulnerable passwords with capital letters.   
The LinkedIn dataset produced 477,945 passwords with at least one uppercase 
character (17.49%).  In comparison, to Weir’s results, the LinkedIn passwords provided a 
greater degree of security.  The top ten mangling patterns for LinkedIn account for only 
about 50% of all passwords.  The two most common patterns, all uppercase and first letter 
uppercase follow by lowercase letters, rank fourth and second respectively in the LinkedIn 
list and contribute only 16.90% to the number of passwords with a capital letter.  To 
approach the 90% that the first two mangling rules cover in the RockYou! dataset, an 
attacker would need to apply 359 different mangling rules with uppercase characters to the 
LinkedIn dataset. 
The Weir study determined that passwords which contain at least one uppercase 
letter had a higher probability of having at least one digit or special character.  Our analysis 
of the LinkedIn dataset produced similar results as shown in Table 5: Comparison of 
Lowercase v. Uppercase and  
Figure 4: Comparison of Lowercase v. Uppercase. 
Table 5: Comparison of Lowercase v. Uppercase 
Metric RockYou!: No 
Uppercase 
Characters 
LinkedIn: No 
Uppercase 
Characters 
RockYou!: Only 
Passwords that 
Contained an 
Uppercase 
LinkedIn: Only 
Passwords that 
Contained an 
Uppercase 
Average Length 7.86 characters 7.75 characters 8.28 characters 8.21 characters 
% that Contained 
a Digit 
53.93% 69.94% 55.74% 
 
82.68% 
% that Contained 3.15% 2.96% 7.87% 13.18% 
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a Special Char  
 
Figure 4: Comparison of Lowercase v. Uppercase 
 
A significant difference exists between the two datasets in the digit and special 
character category.  In the RockYou! dataset, Weir observed only a 1.81% difference 
between passwords with at least a single uppercase character and passwords without an 
uppercase character.  The difference observed in the LinkedIn dataset was 12.74%.  In the 
category of at least one uppercase character and at least one special character, Weir’s dataset 
started slightly higher (3.15% ) for passwords without uppercase characters than the 
LinkedIn dataset (2.96%).  However, the RockYou! dataset only grew to 7.87% in this 
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category, while the LinkedIn dataset more than quadrupled in size (13.18%) to surpass 
RockYou!. 
Special Characters 
We will conclude our analysis of character sets by identifying habits and patterns of 
users when they construct passwords which contain special characters.  Of the 2,732,643 
LinkedIn passwords cracked, 129,744 passwords (4.75%) contain at least one special 
character.  As we discovered with numbers, users rarely choose special characters randomly.  
Our study revealed that of the thirty-three special characters, 90.72% of the passwords 
which contain a single letter special characters appear in the top ten ranking.  Weir 
discovered that a similarly high number (85.34%) of single letter special characters in the 
RockYou! dataset appear in the top ten ranking.  The results of both studies appear in Table 
6: Top Ten One Letter Special Characters. 
 
 
Table 6: Top Ten One Letter Special Characters 
Rank RockYou!: 
Special Character 
RockYou!: 
Probability 
LinkedIn: 
Special Character 
LinkedIn: 
Probability 
1 . 17.81% ! 24.08% 
2 _ 14.72% @ 17.93% 
3 ! 11.34% # 10.46% 
4 - 10.25% $ 8.18% 
5 <space> 8.72% . 7.98% 
6 @ 7.19% * 7.43% 
7 * 6.54% _ 6.35% 
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Rank RockYou!: 
Special Character 
RockYou!: 
Probability 
LinkedIn: 
Special Character 
LinkedIn: 
Probability 
8 # 3.92% - 5.16% 
9 / 3.01% % 1.60% 
10 & 1.84% & 1.55% 
 
As with the study of digits, these two datasets share eight of the top ten special characters: 
exclamation point (!), underscore ( _), period (.), commercial at(@), hyphen(-), asterisk (*), 
pound (#), and ampersand (&).  These eight characters represent 73.61% of the one letter 
special character passwords in the RockYou! dataset which Weir studied and 80.94% of the 
LinkedIn passwords which we revealed.  In terms of key space, the attacker would be able to 
reduce the amount of work required in a brute force attack by searching only one quarter of 
the special characters for a return of approximately 75% of the passwords with one special 
character. 
To better understand how a user constructs passwords which contain special 
characters, Table 7: Top Ten Structures for Special Characters identifies the placement of 
special characters in seven character passwords. 
Table 7: Top Ten Structures for Special Characters 
A=Alpha, D=Digit, S=Special 
Rank RockYou! 
Structure 
RockYou!: 
Probability 
LinkedIn:  
Structure 
LinkedIn: 
Probability 
1 AAAAAAS  28.50% AAAAASD 13.60% 
2 AAASAAA  7.87% AAAASDD 13.22% 
3 AAAASDD  6.32% AAAAAAS 11.95% 
4 AAAAASD  6.18% AAAADDS 6.25% 
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Rank RockYou! 
Structure 
RockYou!: 
Probability 
LinkedIn:  
Structure 
LinkedIn: 
Probability 
5 AASAAAA  3.43% AAAAADS 6.12% 
6 AAAASAA  2.76% AAASDDD 5.38% 
7 AAAAASA  2.64% AAADDDS 4.81% 
8 SAAAAAS  2.50% AAASAAA 3.86% 
9 ASAAAAA  2.38% AAAASAA 2.13% 
10 AAAAASS  2.17% AADDDDS 1.61% 
 
Again we observe overlap in the lists.  Five character patterns appear in both the RockYou! 
and the LinkedIn dataset: AAAAAAS, AAASAAA, AAAASDD, AAAAASD, and 
AAAASAA.  The pattern of appending a single special character to the end of an alphabetic 
string holds the top ranking in the RockYou! dataset with 28.50% of the passwords with 
special character passwords using that pattern.  At 13.60%, the top ranking item in the 
LinkedIn list is less than half of the top ranking item for RockYou!.  For passwords with 
special characters, the top ten list comprises 64.75% of all patterns for the RockYou! dataset 
and 68.93% of all patterns for the LinkedIn dataset.  As shown in Table 1: Password 
Information, the LinkedIn dataset contains a higher percentage of passwords with special 
characters than the RockYou! dataset.  However, users generally chose the same characters 
and add them in a predictable manner making their use less effective from a security 
perspective than if they had been applied in a less conventional manner. 
Analysis summary 
Since numbers, uppercase characters, and special characters expand the key space 
and add to the complexity of a password, we studied each of these character types to better 
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understand whether RockYou! users or LinkedIn users made more secure password choices.  
In both the RockYou! and LinkedIn password lists, we found that as the length of the 
password increases the percentage of digits, uppercase characters, and special characters also 
increase.  We noticed that the use of common numbers was consistent between the two 
password lists with eight of the top ten digits shared between the lists.  When digits 
appeared, the RockYou! dataset used them more predictably and less securely with three 
times the number of all digit passwords than the LinkedIn dataset.  We discovered that the 
use of uppercase characters was more prevalent in the LinkedIn dataset and more secure.  
When uppercase characters were used in the RockYou! dataset, almost 90% of the 
passwords containing uppercase characters utilized only two patterns: all uppercase letters 
and a first character uppercase followed by all lowercase characters.  In comparison, the top 
two patterns for LinkedIn account for only 24.10% of the total number of passwords with 
capital letters.  Special characters appeared more frequently in the LinkedIn dataset also.  
The LinkedIn users chose more predictable special characters and used them in common 
patterns more frequently than RockYou! users. 
NIST 
Next we calculated the password entropy as defined in the NIST 800-63-1 Electronic 
Authentication Guidelines [30].  NIST entropy provides a measurement system for rating a 
password’s complexity based on the attributes of length and character composition.  It 
should be made clear that we will not use Shannon’s definition of entropy which is the default 
definition of the term in the field of information theory.  Verhuel [31] and Massey [32] 
question the effectiveness of applying Shannon’s entropy calculations to evaluate password 
strength, and Weir [5] proves that entropy fails to measure the effectiveness of password 
creation rules. We will also not use the NIST entropy score to gauge the password’s 
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resistance to an attack.  Instead, we calculated entropy in this study to measure the 
complexity of the two datasets and to compare the results. 
Up to this point, we have included passwords with foreign letters and other 
characters in our analysis because they also contain characters from the uppercase, 
lowercase, number and special character sets found in Table 10: Character Set for Entropy 
Calculations.  For a more concise calculation of entropy on the LinkedIn dataset, the 328 
passwords with a character outside of the 95 letter character set appearing in will be omitted.   
The NIST standard calculates password entropy using the following criteria: 
1. Assign the first character 4 bits. 
2. Assign characters two through eight 2 bits each. 
3. Assign characters nine through twenty 1.5 bits each. 
4. Assign characters greater than twenty 1 bit. 
5. Add 6 bits for both upper case and non-alphabetic characters. 
6. Add 6 bits for an extensive dictionary check. 
The LinkedIn dataset contains no passwords with less than six characters.  For this reason, 
the minimum entropy of the dataset begins at 14, and 522,186 passwords possess this value.  
The maximum entropy value of 48 belongs to two passwords: “Thequickbrownfox666.” and 
“Supercal1frag1l1st1c”.  We calculated the average number of entropy bits in the LinkedIn 
passwords cracked to be 18.95.  In comparison Weir observed passwords with entropy 
values in the range of 4 to 32.  Weir does not provide an average entropy calculation on the 
RockYou! dataset. 
Table 8: LinkedIn Totals based on NIST Guidelines displays the total number of 
passwords which meet each category for calculating entropy.  Table 11: LinkedIn Entropy 
Totals in the Appendix C provides calculations for arriving at the average. 
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Table 8: LinkedIn Totals based on NIST Guidelines 
Character length No uppercase 
or dictionary 
bonus 
Number of 
passwords 
which contain 
uppercase and 
either a special 
character or 
number 
Number of 
passwords 
which receive 
dictionary bonus 
only 
Number of 
passwords 
which contain 
uppercase and 
either a special 
character or 
number and 
receive 
dictionary bonus 
6 522186 26277 7916 15308 
7 460506 38655 28019 34812 
8 722772 97138 70982 35354 
9 241420 52442 21280 18268 
10 140298 31936 15440 13198 
11 50858 13804 7461 7096 
12 22545 6191 4432 3771 
13 7827 2170 1682 1776 
14 3154 779 885 737 
15 1027 206 302 264 
16 485 75 302 149 
17 30 4 9 17 
18 9 1 13 8 
19 6 1 3 2 
20 4  3 2 
21   2  
22   2  
23   1  
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Chapter5 
 
Conclusion 
 
Text based passwords dominate all other forms of authentication.  Their popularity 
stems from the cost effective means that they provide for controlling access to a system.  
Despite this widespread use, the choices that human beings must make to create memorable 
passwords limit the level of security that password authentication can possess.  Our study 
echoes the findings of previous research which proves that users frequently select easy to 
remember and type passwords which provide more security than the password creation rules 
require, but fail to provide enough security to deter an attacker.  In this thesis we first 
recovered 2,732,643 plaintext passwords from the SHA1 hashed LinkedIn Password 
Verification Data file.  Using open source password cracking tools, we uncovered 47% of 
the passwords in the LinkedIn dataset. 
Next we analyzed the passwords and compared our results with the RockYou! 
passwords that Weir studied to discover that the passwords used to authenticate users on the 
professional social media site LinkedIn provides slightly better security than the passwords 
which authenticate users of social media RockYou! games.  We found that LinkedIn 
passwords contained a greater percentage of numbers, special characters, and uppercase 
letters than RockYou!.  We discovered fewer all digit passwords which have a relatively small 
key space.  The LinkedIn dataset also possessed greater complexity when uppercase letters 
appeared in passwords.  Although special characters appeared more frequently in the 
LinkedIn dataset, the RockYou! dataset demonstrated a higher level of complexity than 
LinkedIn with respect to one letter special character usage.  Lastly we found that the entropy 
based on the NIST 800-63-1 Electronic Authentication Guidelines started and ended higher 
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for LinkedIn passwords than RockYou!.  The lack of data with respect to average entropy in 
the Weir study prevents a direct comparison of this metric.   
Areas of Further Research 
The hashes cracked and analyzed in our study possess two significant differences 
with the dataset used in the Weir study of RockYou! passwords.   The password lists were 
obtained in completely different manners, and the password lists contain differences with 
respect to the existence of duplicate values.   
An attacker exploited the RockYou! authentication system using a SQL injection 
attack.  This type of exploit allowed the Weir study to randomly shuffle and analyze groups 
of plaintext passwords from the entire RockYou! list.  The LinkedIn dataset appeared on a 
Russian hacking website hashed.  Through our efforts we obtained only about half of the 
passwords, and these passwords represent the easiest to crack.  Although we have proven 
that the LinkedIn list contains greater complexity with respect to length, character 
composition, and NIST entropy average, we cannot prove the true difference between the 
datasets, because the most complex, hashed, LinkedIn passwords cannot be used in our 
analysis. 
The RockYou! dataset studied by Weir contains over 32 million plaintext passwords.  
In this list we identified 14,344,386 unique passwords. Of this list 2,459,759 passwords 
appeared more than once.  Although duplicates appeared in the LinkedIn list, the list of 
zero-leading hashes is unique and the list of straight SHA1 hashes is unique.  The duplication 
between lists occurred when we replaced the first five characters of the straight SHA1 
hashes with zeroes and searched for duplicates in the zero-leading hashes.  Since each 
duplicates only appeared one time, it seems that duplication resulted from copying hashes 
between lists and not moving hashes between lists. 
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For future research, we would recommend cracking a greater percentage of LinkedIn 
hashes to better understand the password choices made on the professional social media site.  
We would also recommend performing an independent study of unique RockYou! 
passwords, rather than using results which contain duplicates from the Weir study.  As an 
alternative if a dataset from a personal social media site, like Facebook or Google+, became 
available, analyzing and comparing unique passwords would provide a better understand of 
the choices that users make when protecting different types of social media accounts.
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Appendix A 
Table 9: Password cracking history 
Name Year Passwords Number (%) 
Cracked 
Source Obtained Cracking Method 
Morris, 
Thompson 
1978 3289 2381 
(86%) 
Unknown “gathered from many users over a long 
period of time” 
Dictionary 
Klein 1990 13797 3340 
(24.2%) 
Survey requesting 
/etc/passwd file on 
Unix machines 
Voluntary solicitation of friends Dictionary, Mangling 
Spafford 1992 19100 13787 
(72.18%) 
54 machines in the 
Department of 
Computer Sciences and 
Computing Center 
collection software installed on 
machines 
Dictionary 
Wu 1999 slightly over 
25,000 
2045 
(approximate
ly 8.18%) 
authentication server of 
a large 
Kerberos realm, 
serving over 25,000 
users 
collected from authentication server Dictionary and 
simple mangling 
Kuo 2004 144 4% 
 
Survey Participants to 
Craigslist ad 
Voluntary solicitation from craigslist and 
student-hosted bulletin board 
Dictionary, Mangling, 
BruteForce 
Narayanan, 
Shmatikov 
2005 142  67.6 Passware provided by Passware Dictionary – 
modified version of 
Markovian filter 
Rainbow 
Schneier 2006 34000 N/A MySpace Phishing attack N/A 
Dell Amico, 
Michiardi, 
Roudier 
2010 Italian 9317 
Finish 15,812 
My Space 33,671 
 three: Italian IM server 
Finnish web Forum 
MySpace 2006 
Italian? 
Finnish – publicly disclosed, 
My space - phishing 
Dictionary, mangling, 
Markov chains 
Weir, 
Aggarwal, 
Collins 
Stern 
2010 32 M N/A Rock You! SQL injection attack (unencrypted) N/A 
Devillers 2010 32M N/A RockYou! SQL injection attack N/A 
Bonneau 2012 70M N/A Yahoo! Cooperation of web portal N/A 
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Appendix B 
 
#!/bin/bash 
 
 
#bash script to create an ssh connection and  
#run rcracki_mt between 4:00pm and 7:50am 
#if a previous session exists for the crack 
#it will resume.  Otherwise a new session will 
#be started.  
 
#k Gives hour M gives minute 10:30 is 1030 
time="date +%k%M" 
 
InFile="$HOME/HashInputFiles/Hashesupto915000x5k.txt" 
SesFile=Hashesupto915k 
SessionFile="$HOME/Hashesupto915k.session" 
OutFile="$HOME/HashOutputFiles/passListupto0915000x5k.out" 
 
 
 
#create ssh connection and run rainbow crack  
#if a previous session does not exist start new session otherwise 
resume previous session 
if [ ! -f ${SessionFile} ]; then 
    echo "142 File not found..." 
    if [ ! -f ${OutFile} ]; then 
      echo "142 New Session!" 
      ./rcracki_mt -l ${InFile} -s ${SesFile} -t 8 -o ${SessionFile} 
~/RT_Files & 
    else 
      echo "142 Execution Complete!" >> runCracks.out 
      sleep 10h 
      exit 
    fi 
else 
    echo "142 File found - resume existing sessions!" 
    ./rcracki_mt -l ${InFile} -r -s ${SesFile} -t 8 -o 
${SessionFile} ~/RT_Files & 
fi 
 
 
 
#get the pid of the ssh connection which was just created 
pid=$(pgrep -u quinnmj ssh  -n) 
echo "PID = $pid" 
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#If the time is between 4pm and 11:59pm or 12:00am and 7:50am 
continue running script otherwise exit script 
intimerange="1" 
while [ $intimerange -eq 1 ]; do 
  if ([[ $(eval "$time") -ge 1600 ]] && [[ $(eval "$time") -le 2359 
]]) || ([[ $(eval "$time") -ge 000 ]] && [[ $(eval "$time") -le 750 
]]);then 
      echo "Running at `date +%D%t%T`." 
      sleep 10m # Use sleep 10m 
  else 
      intimerange=0 
  fi 
done 
 
#kill ssh connection 
kill -9 $pid 
 
 
echo "Exiting at `date +%D%t%T`." 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 10: Character Set for Entropy Calculations 
A N a n 0 @ \ > 
B O b o 1 # | , 
C P c p 2 $ ] < 
D Q d q 3 % } Space 
E R e r 4 ^ [  
F S f s 5 & {  
G T g t 6 * ‘  
H U h u 7 ( “  
I V i v 8 ) ;  
J W j w 9 - :  
K X k x ~ _ /  
L Y l y ` = ?  
M Z m z ! + .  
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Appendix C 
 
Table 11: LinkedIn Entropy Totals 
Character 
length 
No uppercase 
or dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits no 
uppercase or 
dictionary 
bonus 
Uppercase but 
no dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits 
Uppercase 
no 
dictionary 
bonus 
No 
uppercase 
but 
dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits 
uppercase but 
dictionary 
bonus 
Both 
uppercase and 
dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits 
Both 
uppercase and 
dictionary 
bonus 
6 522186 7310604 26277 525540 7916 158320 15308 398008 
7 460506 7368096 38655 850410 28019 616418 34812 974736 
8 722772 13009896 97138 2331312 70982 1703568 35354 1060620 
9 241420 4707690 52442 1337271 21280 542640 18268 575442 
10 140298 2946258 31936 862272 15440 416880 13198 435534 
11 50858 1144305 13804 393414 7461 212638.5 7096 244812 
12 22545 541080 6191 185730 4432 132960 3771 135756 
13 7827 199588.5 2170 68355 1682 52983 1776 66600 
14 3154 85158 779 25707 885 29205 737 28743 
15 1027 29269.5 206 7107 302 10419 264 10692 
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Character 
length 
No uppercase 
or dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits no 
uppercase or 
dictionary 
bonus 
Uppercase but 
no dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits 
Uppercase 
no 
dictionary 
bonus 
No 
uppercase 
but 
dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits 
uppercase but 
dictionary 
bonus 
Both 
uppercase and 
dictionary 
bonus 
Total bits 
Both 
uppercase and 
dictionary 
bonus 
16 485 14550 75 2700 302 10872 149 6258 
17 30 945 4 150 9 337.5 17 739.5 
18 9 297 1 39 13 507 8 360 
19 6 207 1 40.5 3 121.5 2 93 
20 4 144   3 126 2 96 
21     2 86   
22     2 88   
23     1 45   
 
Total bits 51774839.5 
Total passwords 2732302 
Average bits 18.94916429 
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